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Personal Medical Information: Privacy or Personal Data
Protection? A Theoretical Approach to Understanding the
Canadian Environment
Wilhelm Peekhaus†
All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my
profession or outside my profession or in daily commerce
with men, which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep
secret and will never reveal.

Neill’s model of privacy. Aside from providing the necessary conceptual framework for the paper that will help
delineate between privacy and personal data protection,
Neill’s model will be adapted to develop a privacy–personal data protection continuum, on which the
various legislative devices will be positioned. The analysis
of the various statutory mechanisms will be limited to a
descriptive discussion designed to conceptualize the
degree to which contemporary legislation is more aptly
construed as protective of privacy or personal data.
Though some attention will be devoted to discussing the
analytic advantages of Neill’s model in responding to
such a query, a normative assessment of her model or the
various acts is beyond the scope of this paper. The
research questions driving this paper include the following three:

– Hippocratic Oath, circa 4th century B.C.

Introduction
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he Hippocratic Oath, which at some level is probably familiar to a large portion of the population,
actually articulates a tension in contemporary society
between the call for privacy rights and claims that access
to medical data is necessary for the benefit of all of
society. The former is a position espoused by libertarians
and the latter is championed by communitarians. The
libertarian applauds the Oath’s insistence that the medical practitioner keep secrets; the communitarian supports the notion, present in the Oath, that there is information that ought to be spread about. This tension
mirrors the inevitable discordance between privacy
(understood in the context of the Oath as secrets relating
to an individual) and access (to the information that
ought to be spread abroad) that continues to be reflected
in contemporary policy discussions about the privacy of
personal information.
Some of the existing literature concerning the privacy of health information seems to suggest that medical
information has a particularly special nature; either
through its oft-cited association with dignity or the need
for its ‘‘unobstructed’’ use by health care practitioners for
a variety of reasons. 1 It is against such a backdrop that
this paper will review and compare a number of legislative mechanisms that have been designed to meet the
challenge of safeguarding the privacy of personal information without completely hindering the continued
flow of information required by economic and health
care systems. An attempt will be made to situate the
Canadian legal environment in respect of privacy legislation within a suitable theoretical framework: Elizabeth

(i) Considering Neill’s ontology of privacy rights,
are the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows
of Personal Data 2 and the European Union
Directive on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data 3 best
characterized as protective of privacy or personal data?
(ii) Do the various provincial health information
protection Acts go beyond the Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act 4 such that health information protection might better be considered more
about privacy than personal data protection?
(iii) Which are aligned with Neill’s model?
In order to respond to these questions, the first part
of the essay will be devoted to explicating Neill’s
ontology of privacy. The paper will then consider the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data and the European
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Ann Wilkinson, from the University of Western Ontario, for her valuable and constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks are also due to
the anonymous reviewers who offered helpful suggestions for improving the manuscript. © W. Peekhaus
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Union Directive on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data in order to assess whether
they protect privacy or personal data. The next section
will engage in a comparative examination of the Canadian federal Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act and the four provincial health
information protection Acts (Alberta, Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, and Ontario). Based upon this comparison,
attention will then turn toward an assessment of
whether the various statutes are concerned more with
privacy or personal data protection, and where they fit in
the privacy debate based on Neill’s model.

Theoretical Model of Privacy
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efore examining the extent of legislative protection
afforded to personal health information in Canada,
consideration must first turn toward the explication of a
theoretical model capable of coherently defending
claims to privacy. In Rites of Privacy and the Privacy
Trade, Elizabeth Neill sets herself the task of developing
a theoretical basis for the justification of privacy in the
context of our technologically advanced society. At the
core of her theory is the question of the ontological
status of human dignity in relation to privacy, which
permits her to delimit the boundaries of legitimate privacy interests and rights. As she correctly points out,
much of the literature has been unable to determine
definitively whether human dignity is an inherent characteristic of humans or rather something that is conferred by society. 5 Indeed, without an unambiguous theoretical foundation, many of the definitions of privacy
that depend upon appeals to human dignity crumble
like sandcastles with the rising tide. By considering the
notion of the ‘‘sacred self’’, which is posited to be that
part of the self integral to personhood, Neill is able to
move beyond this debate.
Neill construes human dignity not as being inborn
but rather as a ‘‘rationally constructed metaphor for
innate properties’’. 6 In developing her theory, Neill further distinguishes between factual and metaphorical
‘‘innateness’’; the former being something that is congenital, whereas the latter is a construction that represents
the former properties. To further refine this distinction,
Neill differentiates between physical and psychological
natural properties, with the former reflecting subsistence
properties and the latter being comprised of an individual’s private and autonomous nature that helps an
individual attain a minimal level of psychological
security. Neill asserts that the production of thought
reflects privacy and autonomy at their most elemental
level. It is the privacy and autonomy of thought that
embodies a person’s perception of his or her innate privacy and autonomy. It is thus from factually innate
properties that society then develops a conception of
human beings as dignified. From this moral conception
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springs the creation and bestowal of rights. Morality
therefore serves to rationally and metaphorically reconstruct factual reality. In order to avoid criticism that metaphor cannot ground entitlement, Neill appeals to the
work of such scholars, as Lawrence Kohlberg, and Philip
Wheelwright, who has defended ‘‘the ontological status
of radical metaphor . . . [as] a medium of fuller, riper
knowing’’. 7
The dual ontological nature of Neill’s theory, which
postulates rights as being both originally created and
bestowed by society, rejects natural rights theory that
views rights as fixed objects given in nature that can be
discovered and applied by humankind. Similar to
Lockean rights theorists, Neill asserts that the development of rights is a gradual process by humans using
rational means, although she does reject the claim that
individuals contract to preserve natural rights. Instead,
Neill posits that humans bestow rights upon one
another as a means of metaphorically expressing the
meaning of innate properties in their lives. By definition,
she therefore also rejects the notion that humans are
born with rights. Rather humans, by virtue of birth, are
provided with the capacity to construct rights. By conceiving the right to privacy as both innate and culturally
bestowed, Neill’s theoretical model is able to differentiate between circumstances in which privacy is a political, social, and individual necessity reflective of the
human dignity in which it is grounded and those in
which claims to privacy stretch beyond any legitimate
connection to the dignity of the ‘‘sacred self’’. 8

Legitimating the Right to Privacy
As Neill argues, the psychological natural properties
inherent in all individuals facilitate the autonomous production of thoughts as well as their protection, since a
person exercises exclusive control over his communication to others. All individuals can therefore be viewed as
innately possessing some degree of privacy. Privacy and
autonomy are posited to factually exist as a property of
people’s thoughts. In turn, the ability to conceal and
determine which thoughts and aspects of one are
divulged to others influences the degree to which a
person is perceived by others as being dignified. It therefore becomes clear how the conception of people as
innately private and autonomous gives rise to the notion
of individuals as being inherently dignified. Perhaps
more importantly, this conception derives from the perception of something actually possessed by humans. As
Neill states, ‘‘it is a moral metaphor for a non-moral fact
of non-physical human nature’’. 9 Put another way, once
humans, who are innately private and autonomous, perceive themselves as such, they develop a conception of
themselves that metaphorically reflects the nature of
these natural properties. Once constructed, this moral
metaphor of dignity becomes factually inherent and
notions of obligation attach to it. Thus it is not human
dignity as a property in and of itself, but rather, a uni-
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versal tendency to perceive people as dignified that
forms the foundation for protecting human dignity as a
right. By protecting privacy, society safeguards not only
the innate natural properties of individuals but also the
emergent perception of humans as dignified. As opposed
to a number of other authors who seek to ground privacy rights in human dignity, but never convincingly
make the connection, Neill’s theory reaches further back
and effectively unpacks the concept as a deliberate construction erected on innate facts, which thus supplies the
moral origin of rights; value and meaning attach to
innate psychological properties by imposing value and
meaning on the moral metaphor that represents them.
The result is an emergent perception of humans as dignified, which, once generalized to include the duties of all
individuals to all others, facilitates the cultural bestowal
of rights. Indeed, in Neill’s theory, the conception of
humans as inherently dignified serves as the moral metaphor for innate properties of privacy and autonomy and
provides the foundation upon which a theoretical moral
obligation to defend human dignity is constructed. It is
from this moral obligation that concrete duties in the
form of norms and rights are constructed. However, it is
important to remember that privacy and autonomy
rights bestowed by society safeguard the moral ideal of
individual dignity, rather than the innate properties of
individual privacy and autonomy, which the metaphor
of human dignity represents.
Thus, Neill’s model contains three levels, including
the innate, the moral-metaphorical, and the manifestsymbolic, all of which aid in the universal development
of natural rights. Once the rights are constructed, a
fourth level materializes: the level of the ‘‘rights trade’’. In
an attempt to secure a private life, individuals engage in
what Neill alternately terms the ‘‘dignity trade’’ or the
‘‘rights trade’’. 10 It is in this sphere that humans assert
claims to privacy, trade them in exchange for other
goods, or, at times, see them expropriated for the public
good. The moral legitimation for such claims is dependent upon whether they derive from absolute static
norms based on innate natural properties (the ‘‘sacred
self’’) or from the ideal of dignity that grounds those
norms.

Applying the Model
As discussed above, the weakness of scholars, such as
Edward Bloustein, who attempt to legitimate privacy
rights through appeals to human dignity rests with their
failure to sufficiently explicate the concept of dignity,
which often leads to attributing to it a factual innateness
that assumes an almost mystical character undeserving of
ontological scrutiny. 11 By conceiving of human dignity
as a metaphor for innate privacy and autonomy and as
the basis upon which to construct duties, Neill not only
addresses the limitations of previous theories, but also
offers a model capable of determining legitimate fluctuating rights with reference to the source of rights in
original human nature.
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In applying her model to questions of privacy protection, Neill distinguishes between infringement of an
individual’s broad right to a private life and infringements of an individual’s narrow privacy rights to
inherent privacy and human dignity. Broad privacy
rights arise as individuals seek to maintain a private life
on the basis of the dignity to which society’s view of
personhood gives them a right. These broader rights are
protected through conventional fluctuating norms.
Narrow privacy rights are the static symbolic protections
that defend the conception of human dignity in Neill’s
ontology by making manifest the obligation that symbolizes that dignity; i.e., the manifest-symbolic or third
level of Neill’s model. These narrow rights are thus safeguarded by natural, conventional static norms. Neill considers them to be conventional because they are culturally determined and natural since they are both locally
absolute and designed to preserve the conception of
humans that is based upon innate qualities. While transgressions of broad rights, or what Neill terms ‘‘trade
transgressions’’, impinge on conventionally bestowed
rights, infringements of narrow rights, which Neill refers
to as ‘‘rites transgressions’’, violate ‘‘innate privacy, individual dignity, or the universal conception of humans as
dignified’’. 12
While society safeguards the basic conception of
human dignity through static norms, individuals may
attempt to have their entire persons viewed as sacred and
therefore deserving of privacy protection. This, however,
is a mistake, according to Neill, because it conflates the
privacy of a private life with privacy of the ‘‘sacred self’’
and attempts to extend the ‘‘sacred self’’ beyond its
inherent limits. The obligation that attaches to human
dignity may only be applied to claims that derive from
innate properties, which is why Neill labels any laws not
based on claims to protect dignity as fluctuating rather
than static norms. Nonetheless, Neill does argue that in
some cases, static and fluctuating privacy norms are both
required, in order to protect the human dignity upon
which moral culture is built. Given this, Neill asserts that
the criterion that should be applied when deciding
whether an infringement of a privacy right is legitimate
is the degree to which that right protects either the
‘‘sacred self’’ or society’s moral conception of the dignity
of humans. Put another way, decisions about what constitutes a legitimate claim to privacy must be decided by
the degree to which they are grounded in an individual’s
ideologically deep, or what she terms ‘‘untradeable’’,
right of privacy and human dignity. Neill therefore
believes that policy analysis and legislative development
should be guided by concern for human dignity, and the
ideologically deep privacy rights that attach to this, rather
than broader privacy claims. As she argues, ‘‘the potential
violation of innate dignity rights is the only viable reason
for a privacy right’’. 13 In order to determine whether an
interest merits protection, its origin must be traced back
through Neill’s structure of rights. Some norms deserve
strong symbolic rights because they emanate at the man-
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ifest-symbolic level, while others may go right back to
the very origin of rights to safeguard the fundamental
privacy and autonomy of the mind. Yet many norms,
while making claims to privacy and autonomy rights,
bear little relationship to symbolic or psychological
properties and rights. As Neill asserts, many that fall
within this category are often protective of economic
interests masquerading as privacy concerns.
From this analytical standpoint, Neill concludes
that medical databases, when used for their intended
purposes and with adequate safeguards against unauthorized access, do not violate static privacy norms. This
would include use of the medical database made by
insurance companies when making decisions about
issuing life insurance policies. According to Neill, an
insurance company does not transgress an individual’s
privacy when it acquires that person’s health information
for decision-making purposes. In such cases, according to
Neill, the individual is seeking to protect an economic
interest in obtaining a life insurance policy without fully
disclosing all the relevant information necessary for the
insurance underwriter to reach a decision. 14 It is only if
information held within medical databases is released to
a third party without the consent of the person that her
innate privacy would be violated. Indeed, Neill claims
that medical information is about the body rather than
of the body and therefore merits protection not through
static norms but rather through fluctuating norms;
norms that are determined by governments who are
under pressure in our information age to demonstrate
that rights are being taken seriously and safeguarded. To
put it another way, Neill’s ontology of natural rights
views the body as a symbol of human dignity and thus
deserving of protection by static norms that express the
dignity of the inner self through reference to the observable self. Information about the health of that body;
however, does not reside within the refuge of what is
considered innately private.
The view of a national medical data bank as not
approaching inherent privacy is grounded in the recognition that the body is neither itself factually innately dignified nor, a related point, that from which our metaphor of human dignity arises. This, I think, has been a
point of massive confusion in Western culture where the
body, which (as an aspect of dignity) is merely a concrete
symbol of what we revere, has, through its concreteness
and as the object around which static norms are constructed, come wrongly to be viewed as the seat of
inherent dignity itself. Yet it is only in its concreteness
that the body represents our dignity and the innate
properties of human thinking, and so facts about our
bodies are not inherently private, even where economic
and other social interests might cause us to wish that
they were. 15
The one area of medical information where Neill
makes an exception is with regard to counselling records,
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which she argues are inherently private because they
reflect the thoughts, and thus the ‘‘mind’’ of an individual, rather than just information about the mind.
Thoughts expressed in confidentiality to a counsellor
provide immediate access to the ‘‘sacred self’’ and therefore warrant the protection offered by static privacy
rights. However, it should be pointed out that this analysis does not mean Neill is arguing against measures
designed to protect medical information, rather, that any
such instruments would defend, under the rubric of privacy, interests other than inherent privacy and dignity.
According to Neill, human dignity is a metaphor
that assumes a dual role; it reflects the innate natural
properties of privacy and autonomy, and, based on these
original, innate properties, it provides the moral justification for constructing societal norms protective of privacy.
Though Neill does not couch her analysis of privacy in
terms of access to information or personal data protection, her model anticipates the tension between these
policy goals. Neill’s model demonstrates that medical
information, with the exception of mental health counselling notes, should be protected by conventional fluctuating norms, rather than the static norms that protect
the fundamental privacy of the ‘‘sacred self’’. Put another
way, because medical information lacks a clear relationship to symbolic or psychological properties and rights,
it, according to Neill’s model, does not warrant protection through an appeal to a strict privacy right. Instead,
this type of personal information merits protection
through fluctuating norms that are subject to tradeoffs
with other fluctuating rights.
Although not explicit, Neill’s distinction between
the privacy of the ‘‘sacred self’’ and the broader privacy
rights associated with the ‘‘rights trade’’ that can be
exchanged for other goods, appears roughly analogous to
the differences between privacy and personal data protection. 16 A ‘‘true’’ privacy interest that protects the
‘‘sacred self’’ warrants strict protection, while other
claims not linked to the ‘‘sacred self’’ are subject to tradeoffs with competing interests. Thus, Neill’s model offers
a compelling theoretical justification of privacy that not
only establishes a convincing link between narrow privacy interests and human dignity, but also helps explain
instances in which interests related to broader privacy
claims and rights might be subject to opposing public
policy claims, which seems to closely reflect the purposes
of personal data protection legislation. Based upon this
distinction it is proposed that we construct a privacy–data protection continuum, which can be utilized
to situate claims to privacy protection. ‘‘True’’ privacy
claims, or those reflective of an individual’s inherent privacy and dignity, occupy one end of the spectrum, while
those broader claims to privacy, which, extrapolating
from Neill’s model, might more appropriately be termed
‘‘data protection’’, find a base at the opposing end (see
Figure 1).
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Figure 1 — Privacy–Personal Data Protection Continuum Based on Elizabeth Neill

With reference to Neill’s ontology of privacy rights,
various international and national legislative devices in
respect of personal (health) information can be evaluated
in terms of the degree to which they address privacy
claims or data protection imperatives and, thus, where
they might be situated on the continuum. It is exactly
upon such an analysis that attention will now focus.

International Privacy Guidelines
and Legislation: Privacy or Data
Protection?
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s a number of researchers argue, the privacy legislation of the 1970s and 1980s was generally designed
to address concerns about the privacy relationship
between the individual and the state. 17 Yet, in the
interim, transformations in the economic, political, and
technological landscape have occasioned the locus of
concern regarding privacy protection to shift toward a
sharpened emphasis on the commercial exploitation of
privacy. 18 Health information, as a sector, has also been
caught up in such changes and has not escaped domestic
and international pressures for minimum standards of
protection for personal information, as well as harmonization between jurisdictions. To better understand some
important responses to this situation, the following
examination of international guidelines and legislation is
offered.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development
By the late 1970s, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (‘‘OECD’’) recognized
the potential for conflict between automatic data
processing capabilities and privacy protection. Indeed,
this concern was being reflected by the introduction of
privacy laws in a number of countries ‘‘to prevent what
are considered to be violations of fundamental human
rights, such as the unlawful storage of personal data, the
storage of inaccurate personal data, or the abuse or
unauthorised disclosure of such data’’. 19 Concerned
about the effect that disparate national treatment of personal data could have on commerce, the OECD adopted
and published in 1980, Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
(‘‘OECD Guidelines’’) in an attempt to spur harmonization of national legislation. The OECD Guidelines set
out the following eight basic principles that establish
what are often referred to as ‘‘fair information practices’’:

1. Collection Limitation Principle: There should be
limits to the collection of personal data and any
such data should be obtained by lawful and fair
means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject. 20
2. Data Quality Principle: Personal data should be
relevant to the purposes for which they are to be
used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept upto-date.
3. Purpose Specification Principle: The purposes for
which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection
and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment
of those purposes or such others as are not
incompatible with those purposes and as are
specified on each occasion of change of purpose.
4. Use Limitation Principle: Personal data should
not be disclosed, made available or otherwise
used for purposes other than those specified in
accordance with paragraph 3 [purpose specification principle] except
(a) with the consent of the data subject; or
(b) by the authority of law.
5. Security Safeguards Principle: Personal data
should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised
access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.
6. Openness Principle: There should be a general
policy of openness about developments, practices
and policies with respect to personal data. Means
should be readily available of establishing the
existence and nature of personal data, and the
main purposes of their use, as well as the identity
and usual residence of the data controller.
7. Individual Participation Principle: An individual
should have the right:
(a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise,
confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him;
(b) to have communicated to him, data relating
to him
(i) within a reasonable time;
(ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;
(iii) in a reasonable manner;
(iv) in a form that is readily intelligible to
him;
(v) to be given reasons if a request made . . .
is denied, and to be able to challenge
such denial; and
(vi) to challenge data relating to him and, if
the challenge is successful to have the
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data erased, rectified, completed or
amended.
8. Accountability Principle: A data controller
should be accountable for complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated
above. 21 These Guidelines, which Canada
adopted in 1984, were designed to strike a balance between respect for privacy as a human
right and the facilitation of international data
flows. The importance attributed to the free flow
of information in support of commercial purposes is reflected in one of the recommendations
made by the OECD, contained in its Guidelines,
which states that member countries should
refrain from erecting barriers to data flows in the
name of privacy protection. The OECD Guidelines themselves, which are neutral with regard
to type of technology, apply only to identifiable
information, whether in the public or private
sector and are to be interpreted as minimum
standards that national governments can supplement to legitimately protect personal privacy and
individual liberties. Since the OECD Guidelines
attempt to establish a minimal threshold of privacy protection that can be applied broadly by
individual nations, it is not surprising that they
do not treat health information specifically. The
OECD Guidelines also recognize that different
types of data have different degrees of sensitivity
and thus may not all require protection; however, any exceptions, including those made on
the basis of national sovereignty, national
security and public policy, should be as few as
possible and made known to the public. Considering Neill’s model and the privacy–data protection continuum, the OECD Guidelines appear
more concerned with the protection of personal
data than with privacy and should therefore be
situated toward the middle right of the spectrum, closer to the ontological level of the ‘‘rights
trade’’ that protects the broader, fluctuating
rights to a private life (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 — Location of the OECD Guidelines on Privacy–Personal Data Protection Continuum

While not a universal or binding standard, the eight
principles articulated by the OECD Guidelines are
reflected in one form or another in most Western privacy laws, including Canadian legislation and a Euro-
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pean Union Directive that protects personal data, to
which attention will now turn.

The European Union
The Council of Ministers of the European Union
(EU) formally adopted the Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (‘‘EU Data
Protection Directive’’) on October 24, 1995. 22 A Directive from the Council of Ministers is a type of framework
legislation that, while binding on Member States, does
provide each with the right to determine the means of
implementation and the actual wording of the national
legislation necessary to implement the Directive. For this
reason all members of the EU were granted three years
for implementation. It took five years to develop the
Directive, during which time a number of changes were
made, including: the deletion of a distinction between
the public and private sector, thus mirroring the OECD
Guidelines; the permissibility of a ‘‘negative option’’ with
regard to informed consent; an exemption for the press;
the application of the rules to manually processed data;
the processing of sensitive data; and, the role and independence of national supervisory bodies. 23 The inclusion
of the phrase ‘‘Free Movement of Such Data’’ in the title
of the EU Data Protection Directive, which also accords
with one of the stated purposes of the OECD Guidelines,
is telling of the influence of private sector lobbyists on its
development and content. 24
The EU Data Protection Directive, similar to most
directives promulgated by the Council of Ministers,
requires the reader to first wade through 72 ‘‘whereas
statements’’, drafted to help interpretation and state
intentions, before actually getting to the articles it sets
out. Broadly stated, the 34 articles contained in the EU
Data Protection Directive reflect the ‘‘fair information
practices’’ also found in the OECD Guidelines. The
Directive’s purpose, as outlined in article 1, is to protect
the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons,
especially privacy with respect to the processing of personal data, without obstructing the free flow of information between Member States. Article 2, which sets out
definitions, states, ‘‘‘personal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity’’. 25 Additionally, it is
interesting to note that the EU Data Protection Directive
defines ‘‘processing of personal data’’ in a manner that
combines collection, use, and disclosure of information.
Some commentators have argued that this is perhaps a
more realistic conception of information manipulation
that reflects the fluidity and decentralization of the contemporary environment. 26 Article 3, which discusses
scope, states that ‘‘processing operations concerning
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public security, defence, State security (including the economic well-being of a State when the processing operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of
the State in areas of criminal law’’ as well as the
processing of personal information ‘‘in the course of a
purely personal or household activity’’ fall outside the
purview of the EU Data Protection Directive. 27
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The OECD ‘‘collection limitation principle’’,
arguably the most important element of ‘‘fair information practices’’, is incorporated in the EU Data Protection
Directive through article 6. It requires that personal data
may only be ‘‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way
incompatible with those purposes’’. 28 There is, however,
an exception made for data processing if done for historical, statistical or scientific purposes. Data controllers
must also ensure that the data are accurate, that the
amount of information collected is not excessive in relation to the stated purpose for collection and processing,
and that the data are not kept in identifiable form for
any longer than is necessary to fulfil the original purpose
for their collection. 29
Article 7 of the EU Data Protection Directive outlines the six criteria for judging whether a data
processing operation satisfies the requirement of clause
1(a) of article 6 that personal data must be ‘‘processed
fairly and lawfully’’. The six legal grounds are: the data
subject has given unambiguous consent; processing is
necessary to perform a contract to which the individual
is a party; processing is necessary to comply with a legal
obligation; processing is necessary to protect the vital
interests of the data subject; the processing is necessary
for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest; or processing is required to satisfy the legitimate
interests of the data controller or third party. 30 The last
two grounds for processing personal information may be
overridden by the data subject on ‘‘compelling legitimate
grounds relating to his particular situation’’. 31 Data subjects may also object to the use of their data for direct
marketing purposes, although the Directive leaves the
mechanism, either opt-in or opt-out measures, to the
discretion of Member States. 32
The EU Data Protection Directive also includes
demands related to the OECD ‘‘security safeguards principle’’. Data controllers must ‘‘implement appropriate
technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or
accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or
access’’ and all measures undertaken must be appropriate to the level of risk. 33 These requirements apply to
data controllers who process their own data as well as to
third party organizations contracted by a data controller
to process data on its behalf. 34
The EU Data Protection Directive reflects the
‘‘openness principle’’ of the OECD Guidelines and ‘‘fair
information practices’’ in its requirement that data subjects be provided with information about the identity of
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the data controller or representative, the purposes for
which the data will be processed, the identity of recipients or categories of recipients of the data, and any rights
regarding access to and correction of data. 35 Moreover,
the data controller must ‘‘notify the supervisory
authority referred to in article 28 [public authorities similar to Canada’s Privacy Commissioner] before carrying
out any wholly or partly automatic processing operation
or set of such operations’’. 36 Article 21 further stipulates
that the supervisory authority must maintain a register of
all processing operations for which it receives a notification and that this register shall be made available to the
public.
The ‘‘individual participation principle’’ found in
the OECD Guidelines is also reflected in the EU Data
Protection Directive, through article 12, which outlines a
right of access for data subjects. Data controllers must
confirm ‘‘without excessive delay or expense’’ whether or
not they possess information about an individual, and if
so, the purposes for which the data are being processed
and to whom they will be disclosed. The data controller
must also inform the person as to the source of the
information 37 and an individual has the right to correct,
delete or demand a halt to the processing of any personal
information that is incomplete, incorrect or otherwise in
contravention of one of the provisions of the Directive. 38
Any rectification, erasure or stop to processing must also
be communicated to third parties who have received the
information. 39
The EU Data Protection Directive differs from the
OECD Guidelines in that it generally prohibits the
processing of data concerning health or sex life or any
other personal data that would reveal racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, or trade union membership. 40 The Directive
does, however, provide the following exceptions to this
prohibition: if the data subject provides consent; if the
information is required by a Member State’s national
employment law, provided adequate safeguards are in
place; if the processing is necessary to protect the vital
interests of the data subject; if the processing is done by a
non-profit entity, with a political, philosophical, religious
or trade union mandate only with regard to its own
members, and there is no third party disclosure without
consent; if the data are already in the public realm or are
required for legal proceedings; if the data are required to
facilitate medical care and are processed by a health care
professional subject to either legal or professional obligations of secrecy; and, if the processing is required for
police activities and done only by official authorities. 41
This article also provides a clause that permits Member
States to allow additional exceptions if they are in the
national public interest. 42 The EU Data Protection Directive thus carves out, subject to limited exemptions,
health information, treating this type of information analytically exceptionally vis-à-vis the rest of the Directive.
This may have been done to reflect a perceived higher
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value and thus need for protection that attaches to personal health information, while at the same time
including an exception for medical practitioners so as
not to impede the provision of medical services. Similarly, this qualified prohibition on the use of data
regarding an individual’s health or sex life might also
have been included in the EU Data Protection Directive
to ensure compliance with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(‘‘ECHR’’) 43 adopted by the Council of Europe in 1950,
which stipulates in article 8 the ‘‘right to respect for
private and family life’’. 44 45
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health information by the Directive indicates that its
protection is considered to be more about privacy than
personal data protection. This somewhat anomalous
nature of the EU Data Protection Directive vis-à-vis other
legislative schemes to protect privacy, which warrants
dual placement on the privacy–personal data protection
continuum, is outlined in Figure 3.
Figure 3 — Dual Location of EU Data Protection
Directive on Privacy–Personal Data Protection Continuum
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Article 9 of the EU Data Protection Directive provides exemptions for the processing of personal data carried out for journalistic, artistic, or literary purposes.
Article 13 outlines the exemptions related to national
security, defence, public security, police investigation
activities, economic interests of a Member State or the
European Union, and the protection of the data subject
or of the rights and freedoms of others.
Finally, as briefly alluded to above in the discussion
of the ‘‘openness principle’’, the EU Data Protection
Directive specifies that each Member State must have an
independent public authority responsible for monitoring
the provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive. Each
national authority must be endowed with investigative
powers, the power to engage in legal proceedings or
bring any violations to the attention of the applicable
judicial authorities, and powers of intervention. This
latter power should include the ability to issue opinions
and orders that block or ban processing, the right to
admonish data controllers, and the right to refer matters
to national parliaments. 46 The public authority is also
responsible for receiving and investigating claims from
any person relating to the lawfulness of data processing
about that person.
The EU Data Protection Directive appeals to the
necessity of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms,
or what Neill would presumably consider innate privacy
and autonomy, especially with regard to the qualified
prohibition on the processing of information about a
person’s health or sex life. In general, however, the EU
Data Protection Directive endeavours to protect rights
and freedoms without obstructing data flows; a fact
attested to by the full title of the Directive. For this latter
reason, the Directive contains a number of exemptions
from its scope that are based upon public policy priorities other than privacy protection. The Directive, therefore, cannot be considered to defend what Neill would
consider ‘‘legitimate’’ privacy interests based upon protection of the ‘‘sacred self’’. The rights enunciated by the
EU Data Protection Directive, except with regard to
health and sex life information, align more closely with
broader claims to privacy whose ontological status
would place them closer to the data protection than the
privacy side of the spectrum, similar to that of the OECD
Guidelines. Nonetheless, the special treatment afforded

The OECD Guidelines and the EU Data Protection
Directive thus contain a number of similarities that, in
general, make them more about personal data protection
than privacy. The exception is EU health information,
which, given its special status under the EU Data Protection Directive, is allied more closely with privacy issues
than with personal data protection. If this is the situation
at the international level, what is happening in Canada?

Canadian Federal and Provincial
Legislation

H

aving outlined Neill’s model of privacy protection
and established where two prominent international devices putatively designed to regulate privacy are
situated within that model, this section will engage the
second question driving this paper by comparing the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the provincial Acts in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario that deal specifically with
health information. In addition to presenting a comparative analysis, these pieces of legislation will be assessed to
establish where they fit on the privacy–personal data
continuum, in order to discern whether health information protection in Canada is more about privacy than
personal data protection.

Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act
Although in Canada personal information maintained by the federal government was first safeguarded
by Part IV of the Canadian Human Rights Act 47 of 1977,
and subsequently through the Privacy Act 48 of 1982,
which came into force on July 1, 1983, it was not until
April 13, 2000 when the Personal Information Protection
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and Electronic Documents Act (‘‘PIPEDA’’) received
Royal Assent, that protection began to be extended to
information held by the private sector in Canada. 49 In
the meantime, protection of personal information
throughout much of the rest of the public sector in
Canada had gradually been enacted. 50 Part of the motivation behind enacting the PIPEDA for private sector
privacy protection was perceived international pressure
from the European Union, the member states of which,
in adherence to its Data Protection Directive, would
limit transnational data flows to only those foreign countries with similar legislative mechanisms in place. As the
legislative history of the PIPEDA points out, ‘‘Part I of Bill
C-6 (PIPEDA) also responds to recent privacy initiatives
in Europe . . . The Directive [EU Data Protection Directive] could, therefore, have a negative impact on Canadian businesses engaged in commerce with companies
in European Union countries, unless adequate privacy
legislation is introduced in Canada’’. 51 Indeed, article 25
of the EU Data Protection Directive provides:

2004: the Act now covers all information collected, used
or disclosed during the course of commercial activities
by private sector organizations, not governed under
equivalent provincial legislation. It is the ‘‘commercial
clause’’ 55 that the federal government has used to constitutionally justify the reach of the PIPEDA into what
otherwise might be considered provincial jurisdiction.
The application of this notion of ‘‘commercial activity’’
to the health sector has caused much unresolved confusion since health has traditionally been an area of provincial legislative activity. 56
As defined by the PIPEDA, ‘‘‘commercial activity’
means any particular transaction, act or conduct or any
regular course of conduct that is of a commercial character, including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor,
membership or other fundraising lists’’. 57 Aside from
being circular, such a definition does not go very far in
helping to clarify the scope of the Act. As the Canadian
Institutes of Health Research has pointed out:

1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer
to a third country of personal data which are
undergoing processing or are intended for
processing after transfer may take place only if,
without prejudice to compliance with the
national provisions adopted pursuant to the
other provisions of this Directive, the third
country in question ensures an adequate level of
protection.

There are some important activities in the health sector, the
nature of which cannot yet be clearly determined one way
or another. For example, whether the services of a health
professional carried out in a private clinic reimbursed by the
public purse will be considered ‘‘commercial activity’’
within the meaning of the PIPED Act is not yet known.
Whether the activities of private, not-for-profit organizations
and/or cost-recovery activities constitute ‘‘commercial
activity’’ is likewise impossible to ascertain at this stage and
will likely be circumscribed over time through judicial interpretation. 58

2. The adequacy of the level of protection afforded
by a third country shall be assessed in the light of
all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer
operation or set of data transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature
of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the
country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral,
in force in the third country in question and the
professional rules and security measures which
are complied with in that country. . . . . 52

There is an element of the PIPEDA itself, however,
that might render these constitutional concerns largely
redundant; namely the ‘‘substantially similar’’ clause,
which exempts provinces from having to adhere to the
Act if they pass legislation that the federal government
recognizes as ‘‘substantially similar’’ to the PIPEDA. 59 If
the four provincial health information protection Acts
examined in this paper are so recognized by the federal
government, then not only would the PIPEDA no longer
apply to health information within those provinces, but
such information would receive constitutionally unambiguous protection through provincial acts.

In a decision from December 20, 2001 the EU
Commission stated that Canada’s PIPEDA did meet the
required standard under its Data Protection Directive. 53
Thus, the PIPEDA achieved the objective of ensuring
that EU Member State companies could continue to do
business with Canadian firms.

The federal Department of Industry, whose Minister
is responsible for making recommendations about
exemptions to the Governor in Council, outlined in the
Canada Gazette 60 the process that will be employed to
determine whether provincial legislation may qualify for
an exemption based on the ‘‘substantially similar’’ clause
in the PIPEDA. 61 With reference to the presentation by
then Industry Minister John Manley to the Standing
Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, substantially similar statutes will generally
require ‘‘legislation that provides a basic set of fair information practices which are consistent with the CSA
Standard, oversight by an independent body and redress
for those who are aggrieved’’. 62 As of writing, only
Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act,
2004 (‘‘PHIPA’’) 63 has been recognized as being ‘‘substan-

The full scope of the PIPEDA was implemented in a
staggered fashion. As of January 1, 2001, it applied to all
federally regulated private sector organizations as well as
those that disclosed personal information for consideration across provincial or national boundaries. A Senate
amendment motivated by concern over the applicability
of the Act to personal health information resulted in an
exemption from coverage for health information until
January 1, 2002. 54 In the third phase, all provisions outlined by the PIPEDA came into full force on January 1,
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tially similar’’. 64 The health information protection legislation in Alberta, 65 Manitoba, and Saskatchewan has not.
It should be pointed out that even if the provincial Acts
are deemed equivalent to the PIPEDA, it is the federal
government’s position that the federal Act would still
apply to a health care provider or hospital when
engaging in inter-provincial and international commercial dealings. 66 This might, in turn, still raise the constitutional battle between provincial regulation of health and
federal regulation of inter-provincial trade and commerce.
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The PIPEDA is an interesting piece of legislation in
that it sets out the bulk of its requirements related to fair
information practices in a Schedule rather than directly
in the Act. Moreover, Schedule 1, which sets out the
main information handling provisions with which all
organizations subject to the Act must comply, is, verbatim, the Model Code for the Protection of Personal
Information (‘‘CSA Code’’) 67 developed by the Canadian
Standards Association in 1996. Thus the PIPEDA is not
worded as legislation usually is, but rather, is formulated
using what was originally a voluntary guide to conduct.
Schedule 1 of the Act sets out the following 10 information principles:
1. Accountability: An organization is responsible for
personal information under its control and shall
designate an individual or individuals who are
accountable for the organization’s compliance
with the following principles.
2. Identifying Purposes: The purposes for which
personal information is collected shall be identified by the organization at or before the time the
information is collected.
3. Consent: The knowledge and consent of the
individual are required for the collection, use, or
disclosure of personal information, except where
inappropriate.
4. Limiting Collection: The collection of personal
information shall be limited to that which is necessary for the purposes identified by the organization. Information shall be collected by fair and
lawful means.
5. Limiting Use, Disclosure, and Retention: Personal information shall not be used or disclosed
for purposes other than those for which it was
collected, except with the consent of the individual or as required by law. Personal information shall be retained only as long as necessary
for the fulfilment of those purposes.
6. Accuracy: Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for
the purposes for which it is to be used.
7. Safeguards: Personal information shall be protected by security safeguards appropriate to the
sensitivity of the information.

8. Openness: An organization shall make readily
available to individuals specific information
about its policies and practices relating to the
management of personal information.
9. Individual Access: Upon request, an individual
shall be informed of the existence, use, and disclosure of his or her personal information and
shall be given access to that information. An individual shall be able to challenge the accuracy and
completeness of the information and have it
amended as appropriate.
10. Challenging Compliance: An individual shall be
able to address a challenge concerning compliance with the above principles to the designated
individual or individuals accountable for the
organization’s compliance. 68
As is readily apparent, this Schedule very closely
resembles the OECD Guidelines discussed above, which
is not surprising given that Canada adopted them in
1984, and both the Schedule and the Guidelines are
motivated by the desire to strike a balance between privacy and the free flow of information for commercial
purposes. The only major difference between the two
schemas is that Schedule 1 includes a right for individuals to challenge concerns about compliance with these
‘‘fair information practices’’, something that is not contained in the OECD Guidelines. The PIPEDA, unlike the
EU Data Protection Directive, does not offer a separate
regime of protection for ‘‘sensitive data’’; the PIPEDA
does not provide rules pertaining to the recipients of
personal information; and, the PIPEDA applies only to
organizations engaged in commercial activities; whereas,
the EU Data Protection Directive and the OECD Guidelines apply to all controllers of personal information.
Like the EU Data Protection Directive, the PIPEDA
provides exemptions from coverage, with respect to personal and domestic use of personal data, as well as use
for journalistic, artistic, or literary purposes. Where these
exemptions do not apply, the PIPEDA generally requires
the knowledge and consent of the individual who is the
subject of the data (data subject) before any personal
information may be collected, used, and/or disclosed.
There are, however, some important exceptions. Collection may occur without consent, if consent cannot be
obtained in a timely manner, if it would compromise
the availability or accuracy of the information, or if the
collection is necessary to investigate a crime. 69 Personal
information can be used without consent for police
investigations, in a case of an emergency that threatens
the life, health, or security of an individual, and for statistical or scholarly study or research as long as confidentiality is ensured. 70 Disclosures of personal information
may be made by an organization without the knowledge
or consent of the data subject for debt collection, law
enforcement, national security, emergency situations, statistical compilation and research, 71 to comply with a
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subpoena or warrant, and at the earlier of 100 years after
the record was created or 20 years after the death of the
individual to whom the information pertains. 72 Moreover, if these exemptions apply, an organization may
disclose personal information for purposes other than
those for which it was collected.
The PIPEDA also sets out the procedures for
making requests for access to the information an organization holds about an individual, including time limits
for response, notification and response requirements for
organizations, and prohibitions on access to certain types
of information. Denying access is permissible if doing so
would reveal personal information about a third party
(unless that person consents to disclosure or the information can be severed), if the information is protected by
solicitor–client privilege, if disclosure would reveal confidential commercial information, if release of the information could threaten the life or security of another
person, or if the information was generated in the course
of a formal dispute resolution process. 73
Individuals may file complaints with the federal Privacy Commissioner against organizations that have contravened any of the provisions related to the collection,
use, and disclosure of personal information. When investigating complaints the Commissioner is provided with
powers to summon witnesses, administer oaths, receive
evidence, and enter premises to examine records and
talk with any person located therein. However, unlike
the national authorities in the EU, the federal Privacy
Commissioner lacks any order-making power and must
rely on mediation, conciliation, and recommendations. 74
The above explication and analysis of the PIPEDA
has helped develop a basis of comparison to the four
provincial Acts in respect of health information in order
to respond to the second research question of this paper;
namely, do the various provincial health information
protection Acts go beyond the PIPEDA, such that health
information protection might better be considered,
more about privacy than personal data protection? This
comparative examination will also lay the groundwork
for developing a response to the query about which of
the Acts is aligned with Neill’s model.

Provincial Legislation
The PIPEDA does not hamper the provinces from
enacting legislation within their respective jurisdictions.
It purports to provide a baseline for the protection of
personal information in Canada. In fact, the ‘‘substantially similar’’ clause invites provinces to develop their
own legislation applicable to their distinctive needs and
requirements. As mentioned, to date, four provinces have
promulgated information protection legislation specific
to the health care industry.
All of the provincial Acts, as opposed to the PIPEDA,
apply to health care providers, regardless of whether they
are engaged in commercial activities. Alberta’s Health
Information Act (‘‘HIA’’) received Royal Assent on
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December 8, 1999 and came into force on April 25,
2001. 75 Saskatchewan passed the Health Information
Protection Act (‘‘HIPA’’) on May 6, 1999, which was proclaimed in force on September 1, 2003. 76 Manitoba’s
Personal Health Information Act (‘‘PHIA’’) was passed on
June 28, 1997 and came into force on December 11,
1997. 77 Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) came into force on November 1,
2004 78 and, as mentioned previously, it is the only provincial health information protection act that, as of
writing, has been recognized by the federal government
as being ‘‘substantially similar’’ to the PIPEDA. 79 Each of
the four Acts outlines similar purposes, including the
following: to protect the privacy of individuals with
regard to their health information; to enable access to
and the sharing of health information in order to provide health services and manage the health system; to
prescribe rules for the collection, use, and disclosure of
personal health information; to provide individuals with
rights of access to and correction of their medical
records; to establish remedies for contravention of the
Acts; and, to provide for independent reviews of decisions made under the Act. 80 All four provincial Acts
apply to identifiable personal health information, 81
which includes information about both mental and
physical health. 82 While Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and
Ontario limit the scope of their respective Acts to
encompass only personally identifiable information,
Alberta legislation sets out explicit provisions that permit
the collection, use, and disclosure of non-identifying
health information, with very few restrictions. 83 All of the
Acts further specify their scope by outlining who qualifies as a ‘‘custodian’’ (Alberta), 84 ‘‘trustee’’ (Saskatchewan
and Manitoba), 85 or ‘‘health information custodian’’
(Ontario). 86 These are the people and organizations
required to abide by the provisions of the Acts with
regard to the collection, use, disclosure, retention, and
disposition of personal health information. They include
physicians, hospitals, pharmacists, district health boards,
medical laboratories, special-care homes, mental health
care facilities, and ambulance services, among others.
Trustees and custodians are also responsible for ensuring
the security, confidentiality, accuracy, and integrity of
personal health information in their custody. 87
All of the four Acts contain detailed sections pertaining to the collection of personal health information.
In most cases, the collection of non-identifying information is permissible. Identifiable information may only be
collected if it is directly related and necessary to carry out
a purpose specified by the Act, which is usually the provision of health services. The Acts provide that information
should always be collected directly from the individual
to whom it pertains, unless otherwise authorized by the
individual, impossible in the circumstances, or would
result in the collection of inaccurate information. In
Alberta and Manitoba, a custodian is only required to
take reasonable steps to inform the individual of the
purpose for the collection and there are no provisions
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about consent, 88 while in Saskatchewan and Ontario
consent must be informed, although it may be express or
implied and need not be in writing. 89 Although, at face
value, Alberta and Manitoba would appear to offer less
protection, presumably most individuals would consent
to the collection of personal health information by their
health care provider in order to facilitate the diagnosis
and treatment of services being offered. The more troubling areas of provincial legislation where personal health
information is susceptible to abuse relate to use and
disclosure provisions, to which attention will now turn.
As mentioned previously, the Acts in Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, and Ontario apply only to personally identifiable information, 90 while the Act in Alberta also includes
provisions that permit the collection, use, and disclosure
of non-identifying health information for any purpose. 91
In general, under these Acts, personally identifiable
health information may only be used to provide health
services: for purposes consistent with those that gave rise
to the original collection, to determine the eligibility of a
patient to receive a health service, to monitor and prevent or reveal cases of fraudulent use of publicly funded
health services, to conduct research (subject to ethics
committee review), to conduct investigations relating to
members of a health profession, to provide health services provider education, to obtain payment for services,
to conduct internal management activities, to comply
with subpoenas, warrants, or orders issued by a court,
and for use by a prescribed professional body to discharge its duties. 92 Additionally, in Alberta, provincial
health boards, regional health authorities and the Minister and Ministry of Health may use identifiable health
information for planning and resource allocation, health
system management, public health surveillance, and
health policy development. 93 Similar provisions are also
found in Saskatchewan’s, Manitoba’s, and Ontario’s legislation. 94 The relatively broad range of institutions in all
four provinces that can use personal health information
without the consent of the information subject, has occasioned at least one observer to claim that the provincial
statutes ‘‘have been variously described as having very
little to do with privacy and [being] much more concerned with providing government and researcher[s]
access to confidential medical records’’. 95 While there is
certainly some truth to this accusation, these exemptions
are not surprising when one considers that all the statutes were enacted by provinces; provinces that are
responsible for administering and substantially funding
the health care systems within their jurisdictions.
Without reliable information about these systems, management in times of tight fiscal conditions and rising
expectations, is made quite difficult, if not impossible.
The four provincial Acts contain disclosure provisions that generally prohibit health care providers from
disclosing identifying health information without consent, unless permitted or required by another section of
the respective Act. In addition to the release of information to other health practitioners and for research pur-
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poses, as will be discussed subsequently, all of the Acts
permit disclosure without consent for evaluation purposes by quality of care committees, for court proceedings, for police investigations, for investigations by provincial Ministries of Health for fraud detection purposes,
and to health professional regulatory bodies if required
for investigations. With regard to disclosure, the Ontario
Information and Privacy Commissioner has commented
on the role of so-called ‘‘lock boxes’’ in health privacy
legislation, which offer patients the statutory right to
prohibit health care providers from disclosing their
health information to any other providers.
This so-called ‘‘lock box’’, which would provide individuals
with some control over disclosures of their personal health
information, is a key component of privacy protection. In
the absence of any ability to control what information is
shared among health care providers, in some cases
extremely sensitive, subjective, personally damaging, irrelevant, or outdated personal health information could be
shared against the wishes of the individual. 96

Some observers argue that health care providers
have opposed such restrictions on disclosure for fear that
it would require the creation of multiple records, compromise patient care, and increase the potential liability
of health care providers. 97 Only Manitoba’s PHIA 98 and
Ontario’s PHIPA 99 provide this ‘‘lock box’’ type of protection for individuals, although Saskatchewan’s HIPA only
permits disclosure of medical information to other
health care providers without consent ‘‘where it is not
reasonably practicable to obtain consent’’ 100 and only if
the person receiving the information agrees to use it
‘‘only for the purpose for which it is being disclosed’’ and
does not ‘‘make a further disclosure of the information.’’ 101 In addition, all of the provincial Acts permit
disclosure without consent, in order to facilitate the permitted uses discussed above.
All four of the provincial Acts also contain provisions that require ethics approval for research using personally identifiable health information. Section 50 of
Alberta’s HIA empowers the ethics review board to
determine whether consent is required from the individual to whom the information pertains. Similarly, Saskatchewan’s HIPA allows for use of personal health information without consent if ‘‘in the opinion of the
research ethics committee, the potential benefits of the
research project clearly outweigh the potential risk to the
privacy of the subject individual’’. 102 Manitoba’s PHIA
and Ontario’s PHIPA contain very similar provisions. 103
The research exemptions in the provincial Acts are
roughly analogous to the scholarly research exemption
contained in paragraph 7(2)(c) of the PIPEDA.
Each provincial Act also confers on individuals a
general right of access to their medical records under the
control of a custodian or trustee. Each Act outlines the
necessary procedures for making an access request and
includes: a duty to assist individuals with their applications if required; rules about time frames to respond to
requests; allowable fees; correction and amendment of
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information in a record as well as rights of refusal by the
custodian to make a correction; and exemptions for
when access may be denied. 104
The powers granted to Information and Privacy
Commissioners, or Ombudsman in Manitoba, differ
among the four provinces, with Alberta and Ontario
conferring the strongest powers on their Commissioners.
Sections 80 through 82 of the HIA grant the Alberta
Commissioner the ability to make binding orders
regarding access to records by patients, administrative
matters pertaining to time limits and fees, and the collection, use, correction, disclosure, and destruction of health
records. Sections 52 and 53 of Saskatchewan’s HIPA
equip the Commissioner with the ability only to comment and make recommendations. Although individuals
do have the right under section 50 of the HIPA to appeal
to a court a decision by a health care provider refusing
access to a record, this section does not address any other
issues surrounding health information such as use, correction, disclosure, and final disposition. In Manitoba,
Part 4 of the PHIA permits the Ombudsman, as in Saskatchewan, to investigate complaints from individuals
about the treatment of their personal information and to
make recommendations. If warranted, the Manitoba
Ombudsman may also forward complaints to the provincial Attorney General or professional regulatory
bodies. In Ontario, section 61 of the PHIPA confers upon
the Information and Privacy Commissioner the right to
make binding orders about access, collection, use, and
disclosure of personal health information, as well as
orders concerning specific information practices of
health information custodians. These powers were not
contained in the original draft of the PHIPA, but were
requested by the Commissioner in her detailed submission to the Standing Committee examining the bill. 105
The preceding sections, devoted to explicating and
comparing the federal and provincial statutes in respect
of personal (medical) information, have laid the groundwork for engaging in the analysis, taken up in the next
part of this paper, of whether health information protection legislation in Canada is best characterized as concerned about privacy or personal data protection.

Health Information Protection:
Privacy or Personal Data Protection?

A

lthough an exhaustive discussion of all of the provisions contained within the four provincial Acts is
beyond the scope of this paper, the areas highlighted in
the previous section do reflect the most substantive elements of each piece of legislation. While each of the
provincial Acts reflects the ‘‘fair information practices’’
embodied in the OECD Guidelines and CSA Code,
these are sectoral pieces of legislation designed to address
exclusively the health care industry. The provincial Acts
make no distinction between commercial and non-commercial activities and therefore apply to all health care
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providers within their respective jurisdictions. The
PIPEDA is a much broader legislative instrument
designed to establish a minimal threshold of data protection within all sectors of the private market. Moreover,
while principle 4 (‘‘limiting collection’’) of Schedule 1 of
the PIPEDA allows an organization to specify the purposes for which it collects information, the provincial
Acts actually enumerate, and thus limit, the purposes for
which information may be collected. The provincial Acts
further stipulate that information, subject to limited
exceptions, should always be collected directly from the
individual to whom it relates. The PIPEDA is silent on
this point, which, given its commercial nature, is not that
surprising.
Despite these differences, the preceding review has
also made it clear that a number of the obligations
imposed by provincial statute, mirror similar requirements found in the PIPEDA. Support for this position
may be found in the fact that it has been argued, at least
in Ontario, that ‘‘[m]ost physicians who have developed
privacy policies to comply with PIPEDA will only have
to make minor adjustments to them as a result of
PHIPA.’’ 106 Each piece of legislation attempts to vest in
the individual some degree of control over personal
health information by implementing consent requirements before others may collect, use or disclose personally identifiable information. Such consent requirements
notwithstanding, beyond protecting the privacy of an
individual’s medical information, each of the statutes
outlines an additional purpose: fostering information
exchange within an increasingly diverse health care
system. Indeed, each provincial law, like the PIPEDA,
contains multiple provisions that provide for the use and
disclosure of information without the consent of the
data subject. A number of these provincial exemptions
are motivated by other public policy concerns, such as
permitting the exchange of information in order to provide medical treatment, allowing for the collection of
data that can be used for performance evaluation of the
health care system, facilitating research, and detecting
fraud, among other things.
But individuals, given the rather personal nature of
health information, usually perceive a substantial interest
in maintaining the privacy of this type of information.
One of the dilemmas for legislative schemes that regulate health information is therefore how to guard personal information, when its protection runs up against
access interests and requirements, in a manner that reconciles these competing policy goals. In this context
Gostin has concluded, ‘‘one of the burdens of achieving
cost effective and accessible [health] care is a loss of privacy’’. 107 Though certainly present in the PIPEDA, the
provincial Acts demonstrate a greater tension between
access to information and the privacy of personal health
information that appears characteristic of personal data
protection legislation.
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One area of the debate particularly demonstrative of
this strain revolves around medical research and the fears
that a requirement to obtain informed and written consent will stymie research through higher costs and
greater administrative burden. Indeed, Gostin has argued
that increased amounts of available, accurate health
information would facilitate research. 108 This would be
accomplished through the reduced cost of collecting and
analyzing secondary data and through the increased
trustworthiness and generalizability of the data given the
wider scope of collection. However, as Simitis has
explained, personal information for research purposes
will very often entail a use that does not correspond to
the original purpose for which the data were collected. 109
For this reason, he believes that, in such cases, legislation
must ensure that data subjects completely preserve their
rights, meaning that personal information collected for
one purpose and subsequently used for research purposes should require informed consent. As a proponent
of informational self-determination, Simitis asserts that
individuals should have the right to determine whether
their information may be used for research and he is
critical of approaches to data protection that privilege
research. He questions, as lacking credible empirical
proof, the oft-repeated mantra by the research community that a consent requirement would increase the costs
of research and potentially skew results through reduced
sample size and selection bias. On the contrary, he cites
experiences in Germany where such protection for the
data subject increased both cooperation rates and data
reliability. 110
The deliberate balance between privacy and access,
legislated into the provincial health information Acts
and the federal PIPEDA, which reflects the tension found
within the Hippocratic Oath, discussed at the outset of
this paper, demonstrates that all are closer to personal
data protection than to privacy. Indeed, it is quite telling
that all of these statutes regulate how information may
be collected, used, and disclosed, rather than whether
such actions should be permitted in the first place. 111
After all, if they were motivated exclusively by a desire to
safeguard privacy, they would contain extremely limited
access provisions based on explicit consent by the information subject. Put another way, if these statutes were
concerned predominantly with privacy, they would privilege this goal, to the near exclusion of access. However,
to varying degrees, they all seek to strike a balance
between the protection of personal information and
access, which is, in fact, consistent with Neill’s model.
Indeed, although Neill does not explicitly employ the
language of access, she does assert, that personal information, including health information, that is not protective
of the ‘‘sacred self’’ may legitimately be used for decisionmaking purposes. Thus, Neill’s model helps to explain
and make sense of the nature of contemporary medical
information protection legislation, including the tradeoffs contained within. The relative youth of these Acts
means that we currently lack convincing empirical evi-
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dence to determine whether the legislated balance goes
too far in either direction. Proponents of increased access
to medical information forecast improvements to the
overall health of the community. 112 Again, however,
more rigorous investigation is necessary if we are to
determine whether the benefits that purportedly accrue
through greater access would offset the potential disadvantages that might adhere to the corresponding necessary reduction in autonomy and control over personal
information.
It should be clear from the foregoing analysis and
discussion of these federal and provincial enactments
that the provincial Acts go beyond the PIPEDA in protecting personal health information. Nonetheless, there
are similarities between these federal and provincial laws,
in terms of consent requirements and trade-offs between
protection and access, which undoubtedly are motivated
by desires to keep the broader economy and health
sector functioning. For this reason, these statutes might
better be considered more about personal data protection than about privacy.

Reconciling Canadian Legislation with
Neill’s Model
Having established that the Canadian legislation
examined in this paper is more aptly considered protective of personal data than privacy, and that the provincial
Acts offer more protection of personal health information than does the PIPEDA, a concomitant question
arises as to whether the federal and provincial statutes
are aligned with Neill’s model? If so, where would they
be situated on the privacy–personal data protection continuum, that was developed based upon Neill’s ontology
of privacy rights?
While the PIPEDA does bestow the force of Canadian law upon ‘‘fair information practices’’, it is here
argued that the rights outlined by the Act are void of the
moral legitimation integral to Neill’s privacy model.
They do not derive from absolute, static norms based on
the innate natural properties of the ‘‘sacred self’’. Instead,
the federal Act is strongly motivated by commercial
imperatives. This is made most evident by the Act’s reliance on the CSA Code, which closely resembles the
OECD Guidelines in the latter’s attempt to strike a balance between personal data protection and the free flow
of information for business purposes. Similarly, the fact
that the development and passage of the Act was in large
part motivated by concerns about trade between Canada
and the EU, as discussed previously, offers further evidence of the commercial elements driving the PIPEDA.
Indeed, the preamble to the Act states that the PIPEDA is
‘‘[a]n Act to support and promote electronic commerce
by protecting personal information that is collected, used
or disclosed in certain circumstances. . . .’’. 113 Moreover,
the stated purpose of Part 1 (Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector) of the Act is:
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Federal privacy protection for personal information in
the private sector, therefore assumes an instrumental
character, in service of the true legislative goal of facilitating electronic commerce.
The PIPEDA is thus quite candid about its intended
purpose and does not presume to safeguard privacy
under the rubric of the ‘‘sacred self’’. It is clear that the
trade-offs in the legislation endeavour to satisfy competing public policy goals in an attempt to ensure that
Canada continues to profit in the ‘‘ information
economy’’. Rather than appealing to a fundamental
sense of privacy and the necessity of ensuring its protection, the Act specifies a purpose of balancing personal
data protection against commercial interests. As such, the
provisions of the federal Act revolve around what Neill
would classify as broad rights to a private life and trade
transgressions, and thus, more aptly, are considered protective of personal data rather than the privacy of the
‘‘sacred self’’. Indeed, the rights enumerated by the
PIPEDA are certainly not protective of Neill’s conception
of the ‘‘sacred self’’, but neither do they make that claim.
The attempt by the Act to legislate some level of data
protection without couching it in terms of a fundamental appeal to the dignity of privacy is certainly in line
with Neill’s model. For these reasons the PIPEDA would
clearly not be positioned at the left side of the privacy–personal data protection continuum. Nonetheless,
there remains the question of where to situate this
statute vis-à-vis the OECD Guidelines and EU Data Protection Directive. Since the federal Act is so closely allied
with the OECD Guidelines, the obvious choice for the
placement of the former on the continuum is parallel to
the latter, as outlined in Figure 4.
Figure 4 — Location of the PIPEDA on the Privacy–Personal Data Protection Continuum
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. . . to establish, in an era in which technology increasingly
facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules
to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal
information in a manner that recognizes the right to privacy
of individuals with respect to their personal information
and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose
personal information for purposes that a reasonable person
would consider appropriate in the circumstances. 114

In contrast, the provincial legislative protections
offered in respect of personal health information in
Canada, are more difficult to align with Neill’s model.
Moreover, an argument could be advanced that differences in protection between the four statutes warrant
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separate placement of each, although a systematic explication of the differences between the four provincial Acts
goes beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, since they
ultimately all seek to balance protection of personal
health information with other policy objectives, it seems
realistic to group them together for purposes of this
paper.
As discussed above, Neill asserts that only information of the body, which is considered to reflect the
‘‘sacred self’’, deserves privacy protection. Yet, the medical information that is safeguarded by each of the provincial Acts includes both mental and physical information and is therefore both of and about the body.
According to Neill, however, only the mental health
information, of the body, would warrant privacy protection based upon an appeal to the ‘‘sacred self’’. Again, it is
important to recall that Neill does not argue against
providing any protection for physical health information
(about the body), rather she argues that the justification
for any such safeguards must be made with reference to
values other than privacy protection. Indeed, the multiple, and seemingly incongruous, policy goals of these
provincial health information protection Acts appear to
attempt to strike a balance between access and privacy,
making it clear that protection of the ‘‘sacred self’’ is not
the overarching objective. Instead, each Act appears to
consider privacy in terms of its instrumental value. The
various provisions of the statutes are premised on utilitarian concerns about maintaining the patient–health care
provider relationship, advocating and offering autonomy
to individuals over their own information, and perhaps
preventing economic harm and the humiliation of individual patients. The exemptions and limitations written
into each piece of legislation, which actually reduce privacy protection, are ostensibly designed to benefit society
by facilitating information flow within the health care
system. Insofar as this concerns physical health information, the provincial Acts align with Neill’s model. But the
provincial health information protection Acts fail to differentiate between mental and physical health information. Thus, the instrumental treatment of mental health
information under the provincial Acts fails to align with
a position close to the ‘‘sacred self’’ that Neill would
afford this type of information in her model. Based upon
the overall wording and effects of the provincial Acts, it
can be argued that health protection legislation in
Canada finds a place at the fluctuating norms and protection of broad privacy rights level of Neill’s ontology.
While this allies with Neill’s model in terms of the treatment of physical health information, the inclusion of
mental health information at this level of protection is
difficult to reconcile with her ontology of privacy rights.
Since the provincial health Acts treat both mental
and physical health information without making a distinction, it is also difficult to assign them on the privacy–data protection continuum vis-à-vis the PIPEDA,
EU Data Protection Directive, and OECD Guidelines. A
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seemingly obvious solution would be to separate and
place physical and mental health information protection
at different points on the spectrum, as was done with the
EU Data Protection Directive. However, the provincial
Acts treat both types of health information similarly,
whereas the EU Data Protection Directive confers a distinct status upon health and sex life information. It
would therefore be analytically incorrect to split the provincial Acts into different places on the continuum.
Since we have established that none of the provincial laws completely protect the privacy of the ‘‘sacred
self’’, although this would be appropriate for mental
health information according to Neill’s model, an alternative solution might be to locate the provincial Acts at a
position adjacent to the other data protection instruments scrutinized in this paper. Indeed, based upon
Neill’s typology there is nothing about the physical
health information that these provincial Acts strive to
protect that would merit a greater claim to privacy than
the commercial information safeguarded by the PIPEDA,
EU Data Protection Directive, or OECD Guidelines.
Therefore, situating the provincial Acts closer to the data
protection side of the continuum would avoid ascribing
a special status to physical medical information that is
not justified by Neill’s model. This placement would also
certainly account for the competing policy goals of the
legislation, which are reflected in the numerous exemptions designed to facilitate access to personal information. However, such a resolution would ignore the provincial protection afforded mental health information,
which in Neill’s model merits privacy protection due to
its association with the ‘‘sacred self’’. Given this, and
despite the utilitarian nature of the provincial statutes, I
would situate the provincial Acts closer to the European
Union treatment of health information than to the
PIPEDA, EU Data Protection Directive, or OECD Guidelines. By way of qualification, however, the equal treatment given to physical health information by the provincial legislation and the fact that the protection afforded
mental health information is subject to exemptions, militates against placing these Acts to the left side of the
European Union health information. In other words,
placing the provincial Acts too far to the left on the
continuum would seem motivated by an implicit
assumption that medical information warrants special
attention and protection, as compared to ‘‘commercial’’
information. But according to Neill’s model such an
assumption would, in general, be wrong and could only
be defended in respect of mental health information.
Yet, precisely because the provincial statutes offer qualified protection to mental health information, they must
be positioned closer to the privacy protection of the
‘‘sacred self’’ than the other statutes and guidelines
already situated on the continuum. To the extent that
the provincial Acts cover mental health information but
also permit qualified exceptions, they should be positioned between the European Union treatment of health
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information and the European Union–PIPEDA–OECD
Guidelines grouping, as outlined in Figure 5.
Figure 5 — Location of the Provincial Health Information Protection Acts on the Privacy–Personal Data Protection Continuum

Conclusion

T

his paper has sought to explore the relationship and
tension between the privacy and access interests
inherent in contemporary legislative mechanisms that
regulate the collection, use, and disclosure of personal
information in Canada. Elizabeth Neill’s ontology of privacy rights provided the theoretical underpinnings to
analyze and situate certain Canadian legislation currently involved in regulating this relationship. The explication of Neill’s model demonstrated that she considers
human dignity to be a metaphor that assumes a dual
role; it reflects the innate natural properties of privacy
and autonomy, and, based on these original, innate
properties, it provides the moral justification for constructing societal norms protective of privacy. This conceptual construct allows Neill to differentiate between
the broad right to a private life and narrow rights to
inherent privacy and human dignity. The former are
protected through conventional fluctuating norms, while
the latter are safeguarded by natural, conventional static
norms. Transgressions of these static norms, based upon
narrow rights, represent violations of innate privacy and
the individual dignity of the ‘‘sacred self’’. According to
Neill, it is only these rights that warrant protection based
upon an appeal to privacy. Broader rights, although certainly susceptible to transgression, may not be defended
through reference to privacy. It is precisely this distinction that provided the basis for developing the privacy–data protection continuum, upon which the
various legislative devices examined in the paper were
situated.
It was found that the privacy protection offered by
the OECD Guidelines, the EU Data Protection Directive,
and the PIPEDA cannot claim to protect the privacy of
the ‘‘sacred self’’. In fact, with perhaps the exception of
the European Union treatment of health and sex life
information, none of these three data protection instruments asserts a fundamental appeal to the dignity of
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privacy as its predominant justification and purpose,
which is very much in line with Neill’s model. All seek to
establish some level of personal data protection while
also facilitating trade and commerce. Thus, these statutory devices align more closely with broader claims to
privacy, whose ontological status would place them
nearer to the data protection side than to the privacy side
of the continuum. All were therefore characterized as
more protective of personal data than of privacy.
The comparative examination of the PIPEDA and
the four provincial Acts in respect of health information
demonstrated that while there are similarities, the provinces go further in protecting personal health information than does the federal legislation. Nonetheless, each
of the provincial statutes, similar to the PIPEDA, also
demonstrated concern with policy goals beyond the protection of privacy. The analysis made it clear that the
provincial Acts attempt to balance the protection of personal information against competing policy goals that
oftentimes require access to information. Although the
provincial Acts demonstrated a utilitarian nature with
regard to privacy that aligns with Neill’s model, and is
similar to the PIPEDA, their dual treatment of mental
and physical health information rendered their placement on the privacy–data protection continuum somewhat problematic. Neill’s model, which does not privilege medical information about the body, would
generally require that the provincial Acts be situated
closer to personal data protection than to the privacy
side of the continuum. However, since all of the provincial statutes offer qualified protection to mental information of the body, they also safeguard an element of the
‘‘sacred self’’ and thus privacy. For this reason the provincial Acts were ultimately situated on the left side of the
privacy–data protection continuum.
The overall analysis revealed an inherent tension
between privacy and access in all data protection laws,
although it was most pronounced in the medical information protection statutes. Part of this tension stems
from the nature of the medical environment, which
depends upon accurate, current and complete health
data in order to function effectively. Indeed, patients,
health care providers, researchers, policymakers and all
others with a stake in the system require quality information in order to make informed decisions. It thus
becomes obvious that access to information is an integral

part of the health care system in order to facilitate more
effective health care provision, to evaluate the quality
and cost effectiveness of health services, to monitor abuse
and fraud, to track disease, and to research patterns of
disease for prevention and treatment purposes. Although
such a perspective, which encompasses significant communitarian elements, might perhaps reify system values
at the expense of patient rights to privacy, the tension
between privacy and access is not as absolute as one
might think, since both individual and social imperatives
will often intersect in the realm of health information
protection. 115
In this context it became clear that the epistemic
strength of Neill’s ontology of privacy rights rests with its
ability to disentangle the conceptual underbrush associated with the notion of privacy. The guidance offered by
her model for determining valid privacy claims helps
illustrate whether contemporary privacy legislation is
motivated more by privacy or personal data protection
concerns. This, in turn, helps to explain why society
might accept the trade-offs between data protection and
access inherent in all these legislative devices. By effectively identifying the boundaries of what is and what is
not privacy, Neill’s model helps to debunk some of the
rhetoric about the presumed absolute nature of privacy
rights that invariably gets caught up in policy discussions
about legislative protections. Indeed, by cutting through
the rhetoric involved in the debate, Neill helps to bring
clarity to the complexity of information policy and its
development in the ‘‘information age’’. Perhaps by
accepting that privacy has a rather narrow conceptual
justification, we can better comprehend the nature and
value of the personal data protection legislation being
enacted around us. While a libertarian might bristle at
the degree to which communitarians, like Etzioni,
emphasize social virtue at the expense of individual
autonomy, this type of analysis does highlight an important aspect of public policy development; namely, that
societies are almost always unable to make perfect
choices since there will usually be a degree to which one
interest trumps another. This is the area where Elizabeth
Neill’s work could prove most useful; by delineating the
bounds of what qualifies as a legitimate privacy claim,
her model might bring clarity to the public policy process in which legislators must respond to competing
demands for protection and access.
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